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Xhe United States often buys or sells
foreign currencies, hoping to influence
dollar'exchange rates. The most visible
result of these transactions, however,
seems to be a continuing debate about
their appropriateness.
Many economists contend that central
banks can influence foreign exchange
rates only by altering the relative money-
growth rates among countries. If, for
example, the United States wishes to
depreciate the dollar relative to the Ger-
man mark, either the United States must
loosen its monetary policy, or Germany
must tighten, or both. This can pose a
problem, however, if domestic monetary
policy objectives, such as price stability,
are not conducive to an easing in the
United States or a tightening in Germany.
The potential for conflict between inter-
vention and monetary policy arises be-
cause intervention generally does not af-
ford central banks an additional policy
instrument with which to pursue an
exchange-rate target independent of
domestic monetary policy objectives.
Consequently, the implied willingness of
central banks to trade off among possible
conflicting objectives could reduce their
overall credibility. When, for example,
the Federal Reserve sells dollars in ex-
change markets while attempting to
eliminate inflation, it risks weakening the
credibility of its price-level objective.
The controversy also extends to the in-
stitutional arrangements for interven-
tion. In the United States, the Treasury
Department and the Federal Reserve
System share responsibility for inter-
vention, with primary authority vested
in the former. Some fear that because
the Treasury and the Federal Reserve
often disagree about monetary policy,
their common responsibilities for inter-
vention could compromise the Fed's
monetary policy independence and
lessen its credibility.
This Economic Commentary reviews
the debate about intervention and draws
three conclusions: First, with few ex-
ceptions, central banks cannot divorce
their intervention activities from their
monetary policies. Second, exchange-
rate stabilization does not always con-
flict with price stabilization; their com-
patibility depends on the nature of the
underlying economic disturbance.
Third, because of the monetary nature
of exchange rates, the Treasury has
strong incentives both to encourage the
Federal Reserve's participation in inter-
vention and to seek international coop-
eration for the effort.
• Definitions and Distinctions
Debates about intervention center on
an important distinction between non-
sterilized and sterilized intervention.
When, for example, the Federal
Reserve buys German marks with dol-
lars, the transaction increases the sup-
ply of dollars, other things being equal.
Economists refer to intervention that
alters a country's money supply as non-
sterilized intervention. A central bank
can, however, neutralize the effects of
Exchange market intervention di-
vorced from monetary policy is usually
ineffective, but intervention linked to
monetary policy can interfere with
domestic policy objectives. The author
argues that a central bank interested in
maintaining price stability gains little
from intervening, particularly when it
intervenes jointly with fiscal authorities.
its foreign-currency transactions on the
nation's money supply by simultaneously
undertaking offsetting open market opera-
tions. In our example, the Fed could sell
U.S. Treasury securities to offset the
greater supply of dollars resulting from
purchases of marks. Fxonomists refer to
foreign-currency transactions that do not
alter a country's money supply as steril-
ized intervention.
This distinction is an important one be-
cause if sterilized intervention could
alter exchange rates, central banks
could pursue exchange-rate objectives
independent of their domestic mone-
tary policy goals. The Federal Reserve,
for example, could depreciate the dol-
lar relative to the German mark without
the danger of increasing U.S. inflation.
Most countries, including the United
States, do not completely divorce their
exchange-rate decisions from their mone-
tary policy decisions. The Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) sometimes
weighs an exchange-rate objective in its
ISSN 0428-1276monetary policy decisions, typically
when dollar exchange rates have be-
come the focus of public concern.
In this paper, intervention is defined as
any central-bank action to influence
exchange rates. Central banks can
undertake intervention through the pur-
chase of foreign exchange or through
more conventional monetary policy
channels. The monetary effect of buy-
ing German marks is no different from
the monetary effect of buying Treasury
securities. I define sterilized interven-
tion as intervention with no domestic
monetary policy implications, and
domestic monetary policy as central-
bank actions to influence national goals
(such as the price level) but not ex-
change rates. Using these definitions, I
examine not only whether the United
States can successfully pursue interven-
tion independent of its domestic mone-
tary policy goals, but also whether such
intervention is effective.
• Sterilized Intervention
Economists have offered theoretical ex-
planations of how sterilized intervention
might affect exchange rates and have at-
tempted various empirical tests of the
relationships that these theories imply.
Although most of the tests show that
sterilized intervention is ineffectual, a
few do find statistically significant and
quantitatively important relationships be-
tween intervention and exchange rates.
Two broad conclusions seem to emerge
from these studies. First, with near una-
nimity, the findings suggest that steril-
ized intervention does not have a per-
manent effect on exchange rates. This
implies that central banks cannot use
sterilized intervention either to chart a
particular course for an exchange rate,
to smooth long-term movements in an
exchange rate, to establish target zones
for an exchange rate, or to peg an ex-
change rate at a particular value. To
have a lasting effect on exchange rates,
central banks must alter their relative
monetary policies.
Second, although sterilized interven-
tion does not have a lasting impact,
under some circumstances it can have a
temporary influence on exchange rates.
Investigators believe that in these
cases, sterilized intervention might in-
fluence exchange rates by altering
market expectations or perceptions.
Economists like to characterize foreign
exchange markets as operating on the
basis of full knowledge about all relevant
fundamentals. But information is costly,
and relevant data — for example, domes-
tic and foreign price indexes — are often
available only after a delay. Thus, many
traders predicate their short-term fore-
casts of exchange rates on a "technical
analysis" of recent market trends and pat-
terns, instead of on a fully informed
review of economic fundamentals. Some
economists maintain that under these cir-
cumstances, sterilized intervention can
temporarily influence markets either by
altering traders' expectations or by influ-
encing their assessment of current market
conditions.3
To exploit such conditions successfully,
with any hope of improving the mar-
ket's functioning, central banks must
routinely have better information than
the market. They must be able to distin-
guish between exchange-rate movements
that somehow impede the efficient use of
economic resources and those that are
consistent with it. Given that economists
have never been able to specify a set of
fundamentals that satisfactorily defines
such an exchange-rate path, the task of
accurately distinguishing desirable from
undesirable exchange-rate movements
seems formidable, if not impossible.
Moreover, when markets do not base
their short-term expectations solely on
economic fundamentals, a central bank
cannot be certain about how intervention
might affect exchange rates. The market
could view intervention purchases of dol-
lars as a sign that the dollar is fundamen-
tally weak, instead of as a signal that the
central bank will tighten its monetary
policy to appreciate the dollar. If so, inter-
vention purchases of dollars might in-
duce further dollar sales.
Instances may occur when the market
is functioning inefficiently and when
central banks have better information,
but these are rare. As exchange rates drift
away from a path dictated by economic
fundamentals, they offer individuals
who acquire better information a
chance for profits. Although central-
bank traders may occasionally enjoy
priority information about surprise
monetary policy changes, these, by
definition, occur infrequently. General-
ly, exchange traders at central banks
have no obvious advantage over
traders at commercial banks. Thus,
sterilized intervention is not likely to
be effective very often. Indeed, studies
show no consistently significant
relationship between intervention and
exchange-rate movements across dif-
ferent time periods.
• Nonsterilized Intervention
Lacking a consistently effective and
permanent influence on exchange rates
through sterilized intervention, central
banks might undertake nonsterilized in-
tervention. The extent to which this
might interfere with monetary policy
objectives depends on the nature of
economic disturbances.
Exchange-rate stability and price stability
are compatible when domestic monetary
shocks prove to be the source of market
disturbances. In such cases, a central bank
can simultaneously cause prices and ex-
change rates to move in the desired direc-
tions. A surprise decline in domestic
money demand, for example, will tend to
increase prices and depreciate the dollar.
An offsetting contraction in the money
supply will lower prices and appreciate
the dollar. When monetary shocks pre-
dominate, nonsterilized exchange-market
intervention can support price stability.
When domestic real economic shocks
disturb markets, however, attempts to
stabilize exchange rates can actually
accentuate the price effects of those
shocks. If, for example, demand for
U.S. goods increases unexpectedly,
prices rise and the dollar appreciates. If
the Federal Reserve sells dollars to pre-
vent a dollar appreciation, the increased
money supply will push prices higher.
Intervention then prevents exchange-
rate movements from buffering real
economic shocks, and more of the ad-
justment burden falls on prices.The case for focusing monetary policy
on exchange-rate objectives rests on
our ability to distinguish the cause of
any exchange-market disturbance. At
times, this has proven to be an easy
task: Most economists attributed the
dollar's rapid depreciation in the late
1970s to accelerating U.S. inflation. At
other times, however, the source of the
disturbance is less clear. Few analysts
agree about the origins of the dollar's
appreciation in the early 1980s. If
central banks cannot clearly identify
the nature of a shock, they cannot estab-
lish the overall desirability of nonsteril-
ized intervention.
Even when the underlying economic
shock is monetary, the only advantage of
targeting exchange rates rather than the
domestic price level is that exchange
rates might respond faster than prices to
underlying monetary disturbances. Prices
of goods and services are often fixed by
contract and are costly to change, but
traders update exchange-rate quotations
continuously. If exchange rates do not
respond faster than prices, they offer no
clear advantage as a policy target.
Although the presence of domestic
monetary shocks and sticky prices
creates a case for nonsterilized interven-
tion, as noted earlier, such intervention
requires neither foreign-exchange




Many observers believe that central-bank
independence from governmental fiscal
authorities is vital for maintaining credi-
ble price stability. Institutional arrange-
ments for intervention in the United
States, however, forge a bond between
the Treasury Department and the Federal
Reserve, which some observers contend
is inconsistent with central-bank inde-
pendence and which therefore jeopardizes
monetary policy credibility.
The Secretary of the Treasury, as the
country's primary financial officer, is
responsible to the President and to Con-
gress for implementing international
financial policies. As the chief U.S.
representative to the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) and various other
international economic policy forums,
he promotes U.S. interests in the world
financial community.
The Secretary also establishes the coun-
try's exchange-rate regime and inter-
venes in exchange markets when rates
seem inconsistent with national eco-
nomic objectives. The Treasury con-
ducts its exchange-market operations
through the Exchange Stabilization
Fund (ESF), which Congress estab-
lished under the Gold Reserve Act of
1934. The primary objective of the ESF
is to foster short-term exchange-market
stability through purchases and sales of
foreign currency, but the fund also
makes temporary emergency loans to
debtor countries.
The Federal Reserve System, through
the Foreign Exchange Desk at the New
York Fed, acts as the fiscal agent for the
ESF, providing the fund's managers
with current information about exchange
markets and executing ESF transactions.
The Foreign Desk undertakes these trans-
actions at the Treasury's direction. The
Federal Reserve also intervenes for its
own account, with the FOMC bearing
ultimate responsibility for System inter-
vention. Despite the operation of separate
accounts, the Federal Reserve and the
Treasury typically intervene in tandem
and split the intervention transaction
equally.
Although both organizations intervene,
primary responsibility clearly resides with
the Treasury. The Foreign Desk main-
tains close contact with the Treasury and
has never intervened without at least the
Department's tacit approval. From 1981
to 1985, for example, when the Treasury
argued that intervention was ineffective
and sharply curtailed its operations, the
Fed, which did not seem to share the
Treasury's view, curtailed intervention
for its own account. Nevertheless, the
Treasury cannot direct the Federal
Reserve either to intervene for its own
account or to refrain from such interven-
tion, because to do so would constitute a
direct breach of the independence that
Congress intended for the System.
The Federal Reserve is independent
within the government in the sense that
it need not seek congressional or presi-
dential approval for its policy decisions
nor monetize the government's fiscal
activities. Nevertheless, the System is
accountable to Congress, implying both
that Fed policies must conform with
national economic objectives and that
the System must not take actions to
frustrate fiscal policies. Lacking a con-
gressional mandate to focus solely on
price stability, one might expect the
System to weigh exchange-rate consid-
erations more heavily during periods
when the dollar's exchange value raises
national concern.
In addition, the Federal Reserve's role
in global policy discussions sometimes
reinforces its disposition toward pursu-
ing exchange-rate objectives. Although
the Secretary of the Treasury is the
primary international financial officer
of the United States, the Chairman of
the Federal Reserve System shares
many of these responsibilities. The
Chairman is the alternate U.S. Gover-
nor of the IMF and is an active repre-
sentative at international meetings
focusing on global financial matters.
These international forums frequently
seek cooperative policy responses to in-
ternational macroeconomic problems.
Coordinated intervention often follows
such meetings, signaling that the par-
ticipants have agreed upon the nature
of economic problems and that they
will cooperate to resolve them. Under
such circumstances, the Fed would find
it difficult to avoid intervention —
even nonsterilized intervention.
Given the monetary nature of exchange
rates and the limited effectiveness of
sterilized intervention, the Treasury has
strong incentives to encourage the Sys-
tem's participation in foreign-exchange-
market intervention. By encouraging
the active cooperation of the Federal
Reserve, the Treasury reduces the
chances that the System will complete-
ly sterilize the transactions and thus in-
creases the chances that intervention
will influence exchange rates.The Federal Reserve is even more apt to
include an exchange-rate target in its
monetary policy deliberations when the
major industrialized countries undertake
intervention in concert. The Fed inter-
vened in foreign exchange markets in
late 1985 following the Plaza Meeting of
the Group of Five countries and again in
1987 following the Louvre Meeting of
the Group of Seven countries. At both of
these forums, the major industrialized
countries agreed to coordinate macroeco-
nomic policies and to intervene in dollar
exchange markets. These were periods
when the FOMC gave increased weight
to exchange-rate considerations in its
monetary policy deliberations.
• Conclusion
Since the inception of floating exchange
rates in 1973, central banks have fre-
quently intervened in exchange markets
in order to influence exchange rates. Rela-
tive to other countries, the United States
does not often intervene, but when it
does, the dollar amounts can be substan-
tial. In 1989, for example, the United
States bought approximately $20 billion
worth of German marks and Japanese
yen (a record) in an attempt to stabilize
the mark-dollar and the yen-dollar
exchange rates.
U.S. intervention has been a continuing
source of controversy because many see
it as interfering with the attainment of
domestic monetary policy objectives,
notably price stability, and because
some believe that existing institutional
arrangements for intervention in the
United States are inconsistent with
central-bank independence.
This Economic Commentary has illus-
trated three important elements underly-
ing the arguments against heavy and fre-
quent U.S. intervention. First, sterilized
intervention does not appear to provide
central banks with a way to influence
exchange rates systematically and per-
manently. At best, under some rather
unusual circumstances, sterilized inter-
vention can temporarily affect exchange
rates. Second, nonsterilized intervention
can alter nominal exchange rates sys-
tematically and permanently, but when
domestic monetary disturbances are not
the source of underlying shocks to the
exchange market, nonsterilized interven-
tion can conflict with price stability. A
central bank interested in establishing
long-term price stability gains little from
including exchange-rate objectives
among its monetary policy objectives.
Third, if the Federal Reserve must under-
take nonsterilized intervention to influ-
ence exchange rates, then institutional
arrangements that vest intervention deci-
sions primarily with the Treasury may
offer the Department an avenue for
influence over U.S. monetary policy, or
at least create some doubt about the
Federal Reserve's monetary policy
independence.
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